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WHAT IS INNATENESS? 
What is innateness? 
In molecular developmental biology innateness seems as antiquated 
a theoretical construct as instinct and equally peripheral to any actual 
account of gene regulation or morphogenesis. In behavioral ecology, some 
authors regard the innateness concept as irretrievably confused and the 
term 'innate' as one that all serious scientific workers should eschew 
(Bateson, 1991; Bateson & Martin, 1999) whilst others claim that the 
popular demand to know if something is "in our genes" is best construed 
as a question about whether a trait is an adaptation (Symons, 1992: 141). 
In cognitive psychology, however, whether a trait is innate is still regarded 
as a significant question and is often the subject of heated debate (Cowie, 
1999). In an attempt to clarify what is at issue in these debates, philoso-
phers have proposed numerous analyses of the concept of innateness. 
Some years ago, Stephen Stich defined innateness as the disposition to 
appear in the normal course of development, that is, to be part of the 
typical or normal phenotype of that kind of organism (Stich, 1975). More 
recently, Andr6 Ariew has analyzed innateness in terms of developmental 
canalization, a phenomena which he uses to clarify the intuitive idea that 
the innate traits are insensitive to variation in the developmental environ-
ment (Ariew, 1996; Ariew, 1999). William Wimsatt has explicated innateness 
using his concept of 'generative entrenchment': innate traits are those 
upon which many other features of the organism are built and whose 
presence is therefore essential for normal development (Wimsatt, 1986, 
1999). In this issue, James MacLaurin argues that a trait is innate if "there 
exists within the population some mechanism or process that maintains 
the developmental resources which very reliably produce the trait in 
question" (MacLaurin 2002, 126). Fiona Cowie and Richard Samuels 
have both offered methodological analyses of innateness (Cowie, 1999; 
Samuels, in press). Samuels argues that innate traits are 'psychological 
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primitives'—traits that are mentioned in psychological explanations but 
which are not amenable to the explanatory strategies that define psychology 
as a scientific domain. Psychology appeals to innate traits in its explana-
tions, but the explanation of the innate traits themselves lies outside 
psychology. Cowie identifies a number of different roles that the innate-
ness concept has played in particular episodes in the history of philosophy 
and psychology, one of which resembles that described by Samuels. In my 
view, each of these proposals correctly identifies a belief or an intellectual 
strategy that lies behind the use of the term 'innate' in certain specific re-
search contexts. None of them, however, is an adequate account of the con-
cept of innateness. 
In an earlier work I have argued, following a number of developmen-
tal psychologists and behavioral ecologists,1 that the concept of innateness 
conflates a number of independent biological properties and is thus a 
confusing and unhelpful notion with which to understand behavioral or 
cognitive development (Griffiths, 1997). Three broad ideas are bundled 
together in the innateness concept: 
• Developmental fixity 
• Species nature 
• Intended outcome 
For reasons that will become clear below, all three terms refer to 
clusters of related ideas and show up in different forms in different his-
torical, cultural and intellectual contexts. 'Developmental fixity' means 
that the trait is in some sense 'hard to change': it is insensitive to envi-
ronmental inputs in development; its development is or appears 
goal-directed, so that when prevented from developing in one way it 
develops in another; changing it disrupts or impairs development. 
'Species nature' means that innate traits reflect what it is to be an organism 
of that kind, with consequent associations of typicality or universality. 
'Intended outcome' means that innate traits are how the organism is meant 
to develop: to lack them is to be malformed; upbringings that disrupt them 
are simply 'bad rearing', as Konrad Lorenz used to say. This intentional 
or normative element of the innateness concept is today usually assimi-
lated to the idea of design by natural selection: innate traits are those that 
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the organism is designed to possess or which ace programmed in its genes. 
In my earlier work I identified scientific descendants of these three 
clusters of ideas, namely, being insensitive to environmental factors in de-
velopment, being universal in the species (I now prefer the vaguer phrase 
'species-typical') and being the product of adaptive evolution. I argued 
that because these three are empirically disassociated, a theoretical 
construct that conflates them is undesirable. In particular, such a construct 
will give rise to illicit inferences from the presence of one biological 
property to the presence of the others. 
In this paper I want to simultaneously defend my earlier view and 
offer a deeper diagnosis of the problem. The innateness concept is an ex-
pression of 'folk essentialism'—a distinctive feature of pre-scientific thought 
about animate things ('folkbiology'). Folk essentialism understands bio-
logical species as the manifestation of underlying 'natures' shared by all 
members of a species. The three aspects of the innateness concept that I 
identified are all elements of folk essentialism. Since folk essentialism is 
both false and fundamentally inconsistent with the Darwinian view of 
species, it should be rejected. However, folk essentialism is at the very 
least a widespread human cognitive trait, probably pancultural, and quite 
possibly a canalized outcome of cognitive development. Because 'innate' 
is a common term whose vernacular meaning embodies this way of 
thinking about living systems, attempts to stipulate a new, restricted 
meaning for this word are unlikely to be successful. In any case, proposals 
for linguistic form should be formulated with the intention of promoting 
a more accurate understanding of living systems, not preserving intuitions 
that reflect folkbiology. The several proposed explications listed above 
each describe a genuine biological property and several others are needed 
to adequately describe all the phenomena that innateness has been 
invoked to explain. Therefore, I suggest, the use of new, neutral terms for 
each of these several properties is preferable to trying to retain the term 
'innate' for one or more of them. 
Innateness in behavioral science 
Patrick Bateson lists seven different senses in which the term 'innate' 
has been used in animal behavior studies (Bateson, 1991: 21): 
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• Present at birth 
• A behavioral difference caused by a genetic difference 
• Adapted over the course of evolution 
• Unchanging through development 
• Shared by all members of the species 
• Not learned 
• A distinctly organized system of behavior driven from within2 
To this list we can add an eighth sense, that of being something that can 
be taken as given with respect to the set of causal factors currently under 
investigation. This sense is particularly prevalent in psychology, where 
'innate' traits are those that are to be explained biologically rather than 
psychologically (Samuels, in press). Bateson's sixth sense, in which the 
innate traits are simply the complement of the learnt traits, is perhaps an 
instance of this eighth sense, reflecting the domination of psychology by 
learning theory in the period when ethology was reviving the concept of 
an innate trait (see e.g., Tinbergen, 1957). The use of innateness in this last 
sense as a way to block a demand for explanation can make ascriptions of 
innateness the subject of considerable controversy, especially when scien-
tists disagree about explanatory priorities or disciplinary boundaries. This 
is one reason why the reintroduction of the innateness concept to animal 
behavior studies by Konrad Lorenz and other early ethologists (Schiller, 
1957) provoked immediate hostility from developmental psychobiologists 
(Johnston, 2001; Lehrman, 1953). Developmental scientists rejected the 
innateness concept for the same reason they had rejected the instinct 
concept earlier in the century—these concepts are used to signal that the 
traits in question can be treated as given and developmental scientists are 
engaged in elucidating their origins! 
However, the disagreement between Lorenz and his critics was not 
merely a clash between competing explanatory interests and disciplinary 
orientations. Developmentally oriented scientists argued that ethologists 
were using the innateness concept to make invalid inferences via fallacies 
of ambiguity. The properties of developmental fixity, universality and 
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evolutionary origin were freely inferred from one another when develop-
mentalists knew them to be empirically disassociated. The traditional 
notion of universality itself conflates the two very different properties of 
being monomorphic and being pancultural. A trait is monomorphic if only 
one form of that trait is found in a species—the inability to synthesise 
vitamin C and the elevation of the heart rate in fear are monomorphic 
human traits. In contrast, a trait is pancultural if it is found in all cultures. 
Many pan-cultural traits, such as hair color and susceptibility to early-
onset diabetes, are polymorphic: more than one form of the trait exists in 
the same species. Neither being monomorphic nor being pancultural has 
any very strong connection to being the result of adaptive evolution. 
Evolution is as capable of producing polymorphisms as monomorphisms 
and some non-adaptive evolutionary mechanisms, such as developmental 
constraint, are likely to produce monomorphic traits. All healthy human 
beings have the same arrangement of bones in their limbs, an arrangement 
they share with the whole vast group of tetrapods, but the very ubiquity of 
this arrangement is strong evidence that humans do not have it because of 
its adaptive value. Nor need evolved traits be pancultural, as evolutionary 
psychologists are fond of pointing out. Different cultural environments 
can systematically induce different developmental outcomes (Tooby & 
Cosmides, 1992). In this respect different cultures can resemble the different 
ecological zones that induce the same species of plant to develop into 
different ecomorphs, for example, a low-growing shrub at high altitudes and 
an upright tree at lower altitudes. 
The relationship between having an evolutionary explanation and ex-
hibiting developmental fixity is equally problematic. There is no intrinsic 
tendency for evolved traits to be buffered against variation in environ-
mental inputs to development. Developmental psychobiologists since 
Lehrman have documented innumerable cases in which evolved develop-
mental outcomes require a rich and highly specific developmental environ-
ment. In rhesus macaques, for example, the recognition of emotional ex-
pressions in conspecifics and the ability to cooperate in agonistic interaction 
depend on infant social interaction for their development (Mason, 1985). 
These findings throw no doubt whatever on the claim that these abilities 
in adult macaques are the result of adaptive evolution. The constructive 
role of environmental factors in the development of evolved traits should 
come as no surprise. Selection cannot favour a trait that compensates for 
the loss of a developmental input that is, as a matter of fact, reliably 
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available. Evolution does not anticipate future contingencies. In fact, such 
alternative developmental pathways will be dismantled by mutation if a 
developmental input becomes readily available, as happened in the primate 
lineage with the pathway used by most other mammals to synthesize their 
own vitamin C (Jukes & King, 1975). 
Finally, as developmental scientists have reiterated ever since Lehrman, 
universality and developmental fixity cannot be equated. Ariew uses this 
point to argue against Stich's earlier analysis of the innateness concept: 
the fact that a trait is invariant across normal environments leaves it 
entirely open whether this is because the trait is insensitive to environ-
mental factors or because the causally relevant factors are invariant across 
normal environments (Ariew, 1999: 134). In this argument, of course, Ariew 
is using intuitions driven by one element of the innateness concept (de-
velopmental fixity) to argue against an explication that focuses on another 
(universality/species typicality). Ariew's argument is correct, but Stich 
could equally well reply by using intuitions about species-typicality to 
argue against Ariew's explication in terms of developmental fixity. The 
fundamental physiological and mental traits that depend on environmen-
tal vitamin C for their development, for example, are intuitively innate. 
In the light of the developmental critique of the innateness concept, 
some ethologists rejected it entirely, as can be seen in Bateson's work 
(1983, 1991) and in that of Robert A. Hinde (1968). Others used the 
notion of a genetic program to allow them to ignore development in the 
context of studying evolution while admitting that evolved phenotypic 
traits are contingent upon a host of other factors in development. Konrad 
Lorenz took this route in his later work, denying that phenotypic traits 
could be meaningfully described as innate and asserting instead that: 
"certain parts of the information which underlie the adaptedness of the 
whole, and which can be ascertained by the deprivation experiment, are 
innate." (Lorenz, 1965: 40.). Something like this approach has become 
orthodox in contemporary behavioral ecology although it is now more 
usual to say directly that a trait is programmed in the genes than to make 
a detour through the concept of innateness.3 
Folkbiology and folk essentialism 
The term 'folkbiology' refers both to pre-scientific thought about the 
animate realm and to the field that studies such thought (Medin & Atran, 
1999). Research in folkbiology is conducted by cognitive anthropologists 
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who set out to describe and explain patterns of reasoning about the living 
world in various human cultures and by cognitive psychologists who 
study the emergence of these patterns of reasoning in children and their 
manifestation in adults under controlled conditions. Folkbiological 
research in cognitive anthropology has revealed some apparently pancul-
tural features of human thought about the animate realm (Atran, 1990, 
1999; Berlin, 1992, 1999; Coley, Medin, Profitt, Lynch, and Atran, 1999). 
Although classifications of living things are culturally specific, the form 
of these classifications is the same everywhere. Organisms are classified 
hierarchically, with five distinctive taxonomic levels: folk kingdom (e.g., 
plant, animal); life form (e.g., tree, mammal); generic species (e.g., oak, 
dog); folk specific (e.g., white oak, poodle); folk varietal (e.g., spotted 
white oak, toy poodle). This hierarchical taxonomy is used in inductive 
inference: the degree of confidence with which observed properties of one 
organism are projected to another organism is predicted by their 
taxonomic distance from one another in the local scheme of classification. 
Categories at the generic-species level are inductively privileged: higher-
level categories support fewer and weaker inductive inferences while 
lower-level categories add little to the strength or number of inferences. 
Generic species are thus the level at which folk biological reasoning 
operates most powerfully. 
Folkbiology research by cognitive psychologists has produced a 
number of intriguing results. Children think in distinctive ways about the 
cognitive domain of living things, a domain which itself seems to develop 
in a distinctive manner from an earlier domain of animate (self-moving) 
things which includes some things that are not alive and excludes plants 
(Carey, 1985, 1988). Children of kindergarten age presume that each kind 
of organism possesses some unobservable property that explains the dis-
tinctive observable properties of that kind of organism and which 
preserves the specific identity of an organism through massive changes in 
its observable properties (Keil, 1989). This pattern of reasoning is very 
different with the same children's reasoning about artifacts. The specific 
identity of artifacts depends on their observable properties and, as 
children develop further, on those observable properties most relevant to 
the performance of their intended function. Specific identity is not 
preserved through change in these observable features: a screwdriver 
ground down to make an awl is not still "really" a screwdriver. The pattern 
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of thought that seems to imply the existence of some underlying, unob-
servable property that guarantees identity has been labeled "psychological 
essentialism" by Douglas Medin (Medin & Ortony, 1989), but here I will 
refer to it as "folk essentialism": 
People act as if things (e.g., objects) have essences or underlying natures that 
make them the things that they are. Furthermore, the essence constrains or 
generates properties that may vary in their centrality. (Medin, 1989: 1476) 
There is considerable controversy about whether these results should be 
interpreted as support for the existence of a "theory" of living things in 
young children or for "beliefs" about species and their essences (Downes, 
1999). This, fortunately, is an issue that does not need to be settled for the 
purposes of this paper. I can also remain agnostic on the question of how 
specific the essentialistic pattern of inference is to the biological domain 
and certain others (Gelman & Hirschfeld, 1999). All I require for my 
argument here is that there exists an essentialist strategy of explanation in 
folkbiology. Just as Scott Atran has argued that the hierarchical taxonomy 
of early modern biology was derived from folk taxonomy (Atran, 1990), 
I argue that a cluster of biological concepts, such as the pre-Darwinian 
concept of species, the concept of human nature and the innateness concept, 
derive from essentialism in folkbiology. They reflect a way of thinking 
about living systems whose continuing grip on us is explained by the fact 
that it develops long before we are exposed to scientific biology. 
Innateness and folk essentialism 
It is uncontroversial that the scientific concept of species emerged 
smoothly from the pre-scientific practice of categorizing organisms into 
folk species. Folkbiological species categories are understood in terms of 
an underlying essence which is shared by all members of the species and 
which makes each individual the kind of organism that it is. This is 
precisely the "typological" perspective on species that Darwin had to 
displace in order to establish the gradual transformation of one species 
into another. Species are not types to which individual organisms more or 
less imperfectly conform, but abstractions from the pools of overlapping 
variation that constitute the actual populations of that species, a perspec-
tive that Ernst Mayr christened "populational thinking" (Mayr, 1976). 
Folk taxonomy allows traditional societies to interact effectively with the 
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common plants and animals of their region because at a particular time 
and place species often are clearly separated from one another. The limita-
tions of folk taxonomy become apparent when working on larger geo-
graphical and temporal scales. Many species grade into one another 
spatially, and all do so temporally. When individuals exist who are inter-
mediate between two species due to hybridisation or incomplete speciation, 
it is senseless to ask whether these individuals are "really" of one species 
or the other. That question presumes that the species is more than an ab-
straction from the varied individuals that compose it. 
Elliott Sober has argued that the crucial element of Mayr's distinc-
tion between 'typological' and 'populational' perspectives lies in their 
approach to individual variation (Sober, 1980). The typological perspec-
tive sees variation as deviation from a "natural state" that is the same for 
all individuals of that kind. Variant individuals are understood in terms of 
the natural state that they have failed to achieve. The Darwinian approach 
to variation, in contrast, regards species as pools of variation, has no 
concept of ideal type and treats the current average, modal or typical 
organism as a temporary reflection of an ongoing process of change. 
Unlike the typological perspective, the populational perspective does not 
lead to the expectation that species will be confined within a "circle of 
variation," as so many of Darwin's critics supposed must be the case. 
Looked at in this light, Darwin's achievement lies as much in having 
transformed the question of the origin of species as in having answered it. 
The original "mystery of mysteries"4 was why different ideal types of 
organism are realized in different historical epochs. In Darwin's hands, 
the question became how individual organisms, albeit clustered together 
as groups of more or less similar organisms, are succeeded by slightly 
different individual organisms. Throughout his work, Darwin can be 
found arguing against the idea that there is a normal or ideal type of each 
species. In Descent of Man, for example, he argues that medical repre-
sentations of human anatomy are merely useful abstractions from a mass 
of slightly different arrangements of parts, and even slightly different col-
lections of parts (Darwin, 1981 [1871]: 107-11). 
Folkbiology regards essences as common to all members of a species 
and uses a natural-state model of variation in which variant individuals are 
seem as deviations from an ideal type. This much is supported by 
empirical research, as I briefly described in the last section. But I suggest 
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that there are other aspects of folk essentialism that have been less thor-
oughly investigated. First, essences are conceived as striving to realize 
themselves. A trait linked to an organism's essence will tend to reassert 
itself when the distorting influence that prevented its development is 
removed. Second, essences have normative overtones, so that variant in-
dividuals are not merely different but deviant. Individuals who deviate 
from their natural state are not as healthy and flourishing as normal indi-
viduals and no good can come of such deviation from the natural course 
of things. These claims are, of course, testable by the usual methods of 
folkbiology and cognitive developmental psychology, but in the absence 
of an existing empirical literature I can only provide anecdotal evidence 
in their support.5 Consider one of the most enduring of science fictions, 
H. G. Wells's The Island ofDrMoreau, in which the eponymous scientist 
sets out to turn animals into men. Dr Moreau's creations tend to revert to 
their original type, even in modern retellings of the story in which he has 
transformed their genomes! Eventually, they become monsters and 
destroy him. First published in the 1890s, Dr Moreau was a response to 
the new science of developmental mechanics (Entwicklungsmechanik), as 
well as a reflection of contemporary revulsion at the use of vivisection. 
Ten years earlier, scientists such as Wilhelm Roux had set out to transform 
embryology from a descriptive to an experimental science, manipulating 
physical and chemical variables to uncover their role in development and 
throw light on the mechanisms of cell differentiation and morphogenesis. 
Some of their results were the very stuff of science fiction, as when Hans 
Driesch succeeded in cloning the sea urchin by mechanically separating 
the products of the first cell division. Surely the production of humans in 
the laboratory was only a few years away! In the novel, Dr Moreau 
exploits the mechanical "laws of growth" envisioned by scientists like 
Roux to redirect the development of his animals toward the human form. 
The novel has been filmed three times,6 and by 1996 Moreau had become 
a genetic engineer, manipulating the DNA of his unfortunate victims. It is 
striking that Wells's plot is as satisfying to contemporary audiences, 
against this very different scientific background, as it was over a century 
ago. "The laws of growth" and "the genes" can play exactly the same role 
as extraordinarily powerful tools for deflecting nature from its course, but 
which are unable to change the essence of the organism. Moreau 
continues to lament that continual intervention is needed to prevent "the 
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beast" from reasserting itself, and his vision of creating an exact human 
copy still ends in death at the hands of his unnatural creations. The first of 
the two ideas that drive the plot forward, the idea of the essence reassert-
ing itself, seems to me an inevitable concomitant of the explanatory role 
of essences in folkbiology. Essences explain the fact that all members of 
a species resemble one another because the essence generates the resem-
blance. The children in one of Frank C. Keil's experiments are sure that a 
raccoon manipulated to resemble and behave like a skunk will give birth 
to baby raccoons, presumably because it will pass on to them the essence 
of raccoon rather than that of skunk (Keil, 1989). The generative power of 
essences is primarily used to explain reproduction, but it also explains re-
generation, as when dyed hair grows back in its natural colour or a 
coppiced tree grows new trunks. It is this capacity for regeneration that is, 
I suggest, the folkbiological basis for the reversion of Moreau's creations. 
The second idea, that individuals who deviate from their natural state are 
malformed or monstrous is all too familiar. The idea that health, happiness 
and morality can all be achieved by living in accordance with our nature 
did not need Rousseau to give it currency. 
I have suggested that folk essentialism involves belief in unobserv-
able essences shared by all members of a species, which explain the 
normal characteristics of the species, which reassert themselves when 
these characteristics are interfered with and deviation from which is 
viewed as normatively wrong. This complex of ideas can be conveyed in 
our own case by the term 'human nature'. Human nature is both evidenced 
by and used to explain universal (or typical) human traits: "jealousy is 
found in all cultures—it's part of human nature." Human nature is used to 
argue for the futility of interference: "It's no use trying to remove gender 
differences, they're part of human nature." Finally, the idea that ethical 
questions can be investigated by asking what it is to be truly or fully 
human has had followers from Aristotle to contemporary "perfectionism" 
(Hurka, 1993). The idea of human nature is, I suggest, the application of 
folk essentialism to our own case. Human nature is also a near synonym 
for the innate features of human beings. If you give popular-science talk 
and assert that, for instance, addictive behaviour is part of human nature, 
you can count on your audience interpreting this to mean that addictive 
behaviour is innate. It is hard to change, found in all cultures, and so forth. 
Conversely, if something is innate, then it is at least reasonable to refer to 
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it as a part of human nature. I think this is true even of diseases that are 
described as innate. We are "naturally" disposed to suffer from some diseases, 
such as those of old age. If innateness differs from human nature it is, perhaps, 
in having weaker normative overtones. I conclude, then, that the vernac-
ular concept of innateness is also an expression of folk essentialism. 
Doing without innateness 
The innateness concept continues to promote the conflation of different 
biological properties in the ways that brought it into disrepute in animal 
behaviour studies fifty years ago. Innateness allows writers to move 
illicitly from the view that a trait has an adaptive history to the view that 
it is insensitive to environmental influences in development. Popular dis-
cussions of rape or sexual jealousy inspired by contemporary evolutionary 
psychology assume that we have to live with these aspects of "human 
nature" despite the clearest theoretical commitment by evolutionary psy-
chologists to the dependence of evolved traits on the developmental 
environment. Conversely, developmental fixity is seen as a precondition 
of evolutionary explanation despite the massive evidence to the contrary. 
Social constructionists applaud research that shows developmental plas-
ticity because they believe it removes the trait in question from the 
biological realm. In another set of invalid inference, universality, in either 
of its senses, is taken to be the hallmark of adaptive evolution, hence the 
efforts devoted by some evolutionary psychologists to documenting uni-
versality and by social constructionists to documenting cultural differ-
ence. The continuing focus on universality against the background of uni-
versal acceptance that evolution produces polymorphic outcomes is, I 
believe, due in no small part to the continuing use of theoretical constructs 
like innateness and human nature that conflate these distinct biological 
properties. 
It is, of course, possible to define 'innate' in a way that makes use of 
only some limited set of its connotations. But all three aspects of the in-
nateness concept are important and however the term 'innate' is redefined, 
terms will be needed to refer to the aspects of the concept this stipulation 
has excluded. In fact, each of these three broad ideas needs to be further 
subdivided to mark critical biological distinctions. Furthermore, 'innate-
ness' is a term in common use, and one that represents a highly intuitive 
way of thinking about living systems. This existing system of thought acts 
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as a sink that draws new, stipulative usages back towards the established 
use. Substituting what you actually mean whenever you feel tempted to 
use the word 'innate' is an excellent way to resist this slippage of 
meaning. If a trait is found in all healthy individuals or is pancultural, then 
say so. If it has an adaptive-historical explanation, then say that. If it is de-
velopmentally canalized with respect to some set of inputs or is 
generatively entrenched, then say that it is. If the best explanation of a 
certain trait difference in a certain population is genetic, then call this a 
genetic difference. If you mean that the trait is present early in develop-
ment, what could be simpler than to say so? If, finally, you want to 
'blackbox' the development of a trait for the purposes of your current in-
vestigation then saying so will prevent your less methodologically 
reflective colleagues from supposing that you think the trait is . . . innate. 
Paul E. Griffiths 
Department of History and Philosophy of Science 
University of Pittsburgh 
NOTES 
1. Elements of this critique have been made many times by many authors in the last 
sixty years. I myself was drawing on (Bateson, 1991; Gray, 1992; Johnston, 1987; 
Lickliter & Berry, 1990; Oyama, 1990). 
2. A conception of the unit of mental evolution from classical ethology which 
resonates strongly with the idea of a 'mental module' found in contemporary evolutionary 
psychology (Barkow, Cosmides, & Tooby, 1992). 
3. The 'genetic program' idea has some pitfalls of its own. See (Oyama 2000a, b; 
Oyama, Griffiths and Gray, 2001; Griffiths, 2001). 
4. The phrase is Sir John Herschel's and occurs in a call to biologists to resolve the 
great question of the origin of species (Herschel, 1966 [1830]). It is used without ac-
knowledgement on the first page of Origin of Species (Darwin, 1964 [1859]). 
5. What follows looks very much like a traditional 'analysis' of the concepts of 
essence, human nature and innateness by appeals to 'linguistic intuition'. I am, indeed, 
trying to analyse these concepts, but I make no pretension to have access to a special realm 
of conceptual truths. This is speculative folkbiology built on anecdotal evidence. 
6. In 1932 as Island of the Damned with Charles Laughton in the title role, and twice 
under its original title, with Kirk Douglas as the 70s Moreau still resorting to vivisection 
and Marlon Brando in 1996 injecting his victims with human DNA. 
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